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THE REALITIES OF NEUROLAW: A
COMPOSITION OF DATA & RESEARCH

ZURIZADAI BALMAKUND*

"Matching neurological data to legal criteria can be much like
performing a chemical analysis of a cheesecake to find out whether it was
baked with love."'
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the law is to protect the interests of society, and
promote justice. The following paper explores how the interests of justice
are challenged and strengthened by the introduction of interdisciplinary
research. Today the integration of law and neuroscience is at the forefront
of legal admissibility. Cognitive neuroscience has the potential to contribute
a great deal to the legal profession, but the question is whether neuroscience
is prepared to make those contributions right now.2 In order to answer this
question, medical researchers, scholars, and legal professionals need to
gauge whether neuroscience can measure criminal responsibility. To begin
the process researchers must first "clarify legal criteria for criminal
responsibility," 3 and then determine how neurological findings can be used
to demonstrate cohesion to the criteria. The visionaries in each perspective
field have the ability to guide new medical techniques, which have the
power of influence over the law and future public policy. This study
examines a sample of neuroscientific and legal literature, and follows with a
comparative study of DNA and neuroimaging evidence.

* Zurizadai Balmakund is a Judicial Clerk with the Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota, and a
Fall 2014 graduate from the University of St. Thomas School of Law; graduating with her Juris
Doctorate and Masters in Public Policy.
1. Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal
Responsibility? Lessons From Law And Neuroscience, 1124 ANALYSIS N.Y. ACAD. SC. 145, 146
(2008).
2. Luca Amaudo, Cognitive Law: An Introduction, 19 NAT'L ITALIAN AM. B. Ass'N L.J. 1
(2011).
3. Aharoni et al., supra note 1, at 145.
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW

By the end of the twentieth century technological advancements had
been made which redefined research methods applied to study cognitive
decision-making processes.' Researchers are fueled by the potential
relationship between neuroscience and law.' Attorney J. Sherrod Taylor
introduced the term "neurolaw" in 1995 when he explored the possible
influence neuroscientific evidence could have on civil litigation.6
Neuroscience, in the realm of neurolaw, is the study of the "central and
peripheral nervous system" with a focus on the structural composition and
function of the brain in relation to action and decision-making.7 Research is
triggered by the beneficial relationship of cognitive neuroscience
capabilities as tools to increase efficiency and knowledge in the courtroom.
Author Luca Arnaudo assessed the following as the tasks assigned to
cognitive law research:
(1) A better understanding of individual personality as related to the
subject's ability to react in order to assess his responsibilities (not
exclusively the ones having penal relevance); (2) a strengthening
evidence related to the individual ability to act; (3) an improvement
of legal drafting and of the application of legislative and statuary
provisions, in light of a better knowledge of reactions to said
provisions under a cognitive-behavioral profile.'
Researchers in the neurosciences and law hope to expand the tool chest
available to evaluate a defendant's criminality. They are also working to
identify the factors that contribute to developing a cognitive blueprint of a
person's blameworthiness. Those involved are assessing whether current
neurological methods will assist decision makers in making judgments
about criminal liability.
Neuroimaging, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging, may help
scientists identify deceptive behavior and testimony.' Unlike a polygraph
test, neuroscience could potentially provide a more reliable method of
deception interpretation. Researchers hope that the introduction of

4. Amaudo, supra note 2.
5. George J. Annas, Foreword:ImaginingA New Era OfNeuroimaging, Neuroethics, And
Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. MED. 163 (2007).
6. OWEN D. JONES & FRANCIS X. SHEN, INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 349 (Tade Matthias ed. 2012).
7. Amaudo, supra note 2, at 1.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Noel Shafi, Neuroscience And Law: The Evidentiary Value Of Brain Imaging, 11
GRADUATE STUDENT J. PSYCHOL. 27 (2009).
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neuroscience and brain analysis in the courtroom will better assist legal and
medical professions in assessing future danger posed by an individual and
the likelihood of recidivism.
Cognitive research to date has been able to develop a keener
understanding of cognitive ability and the human decision-making
process.10 Neuroimaging analysis is subjective and influenced by physician
decision-making regarding technique and interpretation." Because the
analysis of neuroimaging is subjective, developing a guide to determine
which types of imaging studies can be used, and how each image should be
read, will provide consistency in future utility. Additionally, criminal
responsibility is used in many different contexts, and this context
differentiation seems to indicate "a syndrome of concepts" rather than a
"generic concept." 12 Given criminal law's diverse responsibilities
component, researchers should be wary of confiding in a very basic level of
brain imaging to answer the question of responsibility.13
II.

A SYMBIOTIC

RELATIONSHIP

Scholars in the field of neurolaw have focused their analytic and
scientific energy on "expected developments and risks caused by the
introduction of biometric technologies developed in the field of
neuroscience in trial dynamics, especially regarding evidence examination
in criminal trials." 14 A better understanding of neuroevidence could allow
judges to better gauge what evidence should and should not be admitted in
various criminal contexts. By clearly understanding the tools used to map
brain imaging, judges and jurors have a better chance of advanced and
correct interpretation. In order for neurolaw to become a reality its methods
must follow recognizable guidelines that can be properly applied to a legal
process.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have developed guidelines for assessing
the reliability and admissibility of scientific evidence, thus already limiting
the scope of neurolaw. For example, in order for evidence to be admissible
in a courtroom its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial value, i.e.
the evidence must be able to provide enough information to establish facts
in the case." To achieve successful interpretation neurolaw must create a
standard by which to judge a defendant's neuroimaging to determine

10.
11.
12.
L. PHIL.
13.
14.
15.

Arnaudo, supra note 2.
Shafi, supra note 9.
Nicole Vincent, On The Relevance OfNeuroscience To CriminalResponsibility, 4 CRIM.

77, 82 (2009).
Id.
Arnaudo, supra note 2, at 5.
Shafi, supra note 9.
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whether the legal requirement has been met.16
A. Frye, Daubert, and the FederalRules ofEvidence.
In the interest of justice, the United States Congress developed a set of
federally established rules whereby attorneys and judges present evidence
to a jury in a courtroom; these are commonly referred to as the Federal
Rules of Evidence. In addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence, two
seminal cases shape admissibility of scientific evidence in the United
States.
The first case is Frye v. United States, where defendant, James
Alphonso Frye, was convicted of murder in the second degree and appealed
the court's decision.17 The court in Frye determined that expert testimony
based on scientific technique was admissible when the technique was a
generally accepted practice in the corresponding scientific community."
The court reached this decision after weighing and rejecting the
admissibility of polygraph evidence in the courtroom. The rule also extends
to scientific procedures and principles presented during trial. The Frye
standard, though instructive, is not determinative and is only adhered to by
a handful of states.
The other seminal case in establishing scientific evidence is Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. The Daubert case involved parents
initiating a suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, alleging the
company's drug, Bendectin, caused birth defects in their children.19 The
Daubert standard, created in 1993, states that the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence precedes the Frye standard.2 0 The court determined since
the Federal Rules of Evidence were created in 1972, and superseded Frye,
Frye was no longer the national standard.2 1 Additionally, the court
generated a list of factors to consider when weighing scientific evidence
including:
(1) whether the theory or technique is testable; (2) whether the
theory or technique has in fact been tested; (3) whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (4)
what is the known or potential error rate; (5) whether there has been
an 'existence and maintenance of standards controlling the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Aharoni et al., supra note 1.
Frye v. UnitedStates, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id.
Id.
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technique's operation'; and (6) whether the theory or technique has
attained general acceptance.22
Neuroimaging evidence will be scrutinized under these standards as well as
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Arguably, neuroimaging fulfills many of the
Daubert factors, but the lack of standardization weakens potential

admissibility.
In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide two rules that will
play substantial roles in the admissibility of neuroevidence. The rules state
that only evidence relevant and probative is admissible in court. Federal
Rules of Evidence §401, Test for Relevant Evidence, states: Evidence is
relevant if: "(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action." 2 3 The rule that supplanted the Frye standard states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.2 4
Each rule is directive in admitting scientific evidence for trial, and
supplemented by drafter commentary on admissibility in certain instances.
Although neuroscientific evidence is not presently included in the
commentary section, due to its current unorthodox use, a reframing of
neuroscientific trial presentation may influence a rule change. A handful of
courts have already attempted to establish this framework.
B. Limited Legal Precedent
Neurolaw, still in its infancy, has received some practical recognition in
the courtroom. For instance, neuroimaging played a significant role in
determining the wishes of Terri Schiavo in the Schiavo case.2 5 The case
involved a legal struggle over the prolonged life support of Teresa Marie
Schiavo from 1990 to 2005. Terri's husband, Mr. Schiavo, was focused on
terminating life support once his wife was diagnosed as living in a

22. Id.; see also Charles Adelsheim, Functional Magnetic Resonance Detection Of
Deception: GreatAs FundamentalResearch, 62 MERCER L. REv. 885 (2011).
23. Fed. R. Evid. § 401 (2011).
24. Fed. R. Evid. § 702 (2011).
25. Annas, supra note 5.
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persistent vegetative state. The case was highly publicized and prolonged
by a legal feud between Mr. Schiavo and the legislature. This intervention
led to a seven-year delay before her life support was terminated. Two pieces
of evidence played a significant role in determining Terri Schiavo's case,
(a) a videotape taken of Terri Schiavo as she lay in the hospital, and (b) a
Computerized Tomography scan of Terri's brain. The tape showed Terri
smiling when her family or husband entered the room, which suggested
non-vegetative responses. But the scan of Terri's brain, coupled with expert
testimony from neurologists and Terri's doctors, convinced the appellate
court that Terri's vegetative state was irrefutable.2 6
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons determined that
anyone under the age of eighteen is exempt from the death penalty. Many
analysts believed that the verdict stemmed from medical associations and
scholars, which presented evidence proving that brain peculiarities in
minors may influence their behavior.2 7 The neurological evidence in this
case stated that brain development takes place in stages, and the prefrontal
cortex, which regulates decision-making and judgment, is one of the last
parts of the brain to fully mature.2 8 Additionally, the limbic system, which
processes and manages emotions, is also developing during adolescence.2 9
In 2007 a Pennsylvania appellate court found itself diminishing the
death sentence of a criminal, to life in prison, after neurological evidence
surfaced showing abnormalities in the criminal's frontal lobes.3 0 The judge
was persuaded to rule against the death penalty because the defendant was
unable to function normally due to the aberrations in his brain.3 1
Additionally, the McMurtey v. Ryan court used expert testimony and
brain imaging to prove that a defendant was incompetent to stand trial for
the murder of two men at a ranch home in Tucson, Arizona.3 2 The
defendant was considered incompetent to stand trial because of an inability
to consult with his lawyer regarding his defense, and by failing to
demonstrate a factual understanding of the proceedings of the murder trial.33
This verdict was determined in part by information collected by an
Electroencephalography (EEG) and Computerized Tomography scan
demonstrating temporal lobe damage as the cause for irrational behavior.

26. Id.
27. Amaudo, supra note 2.
28. National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy:
A Guide For Juvenile Justice Advocates, FACT SHEET: SEPTEMBER 2012 UPDATE, Sept. 2012.
29. Id.
30.
Commonwealth v. Pirela,929 A.2d 629 (Pa. 2007).
31. Aharoni et al., supra note 1; see also Commonwealth v. Pirela,929 A.2d 629 (Pa. 2007).
32. Jones & Shen, supra note 6 (citing McMurtey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112 ( 9 th Cir. 2008)).
33. McMurtey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112 ( 9 th Cir. 2008).
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And lastly, the defendant in People v. Goldstein attempted to produce
evidence from a Positron Emission Tomography scan to support a claim of
severe schizophrenia and lack of intent in pushing a woman into the course
of a subway train in New York City.3 4 The court in this case allowed
testimony from two forensic psychiatrists, one for defense counsel and one
for the prosecution.3 5 Defense counsel's expert testified the defendant was
suffering from exacerbated schizophrenic symptoms, which did not allow
him to process right from wrong.3 6 Whereas prosecution's expert testimony
stated defendant's schizophrenia symptoms were mild and at the time of the
crime his disease was in remission.3 7 The court ultimately found defense
counsel's theory of the case and the Positron Emission Tomography scan
evidence unconvincing, and Goldstein was found guilty of murder.3 8
Precedent paints an inconsistent picture with regard to the assessment of
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom, and a few factors contribute to
this divergence.
C. Determining CriminalResponsibilities
One of the challenges facing the use of neuroscience in the courtroom is
the highly persuasive effect neuroimaging can have on uninformed juries.
Introduction and examination of an image by an expert witness will likely
bias a lay jury with the persuasive power of the images and expert
testimony.3 9 Notably, there are discrepancies amongst experts on how
neuroimages should be analyzed, and this subjectivity is the crux of medical
analysis.
Some researchers argue that neuroimaging will never find a home in the
courtroom, but hopeful proponents imagine neuroimaging will illuminate
defendant culpability. Issues arise when responsibility is viewed not as a
decision-making process in a quadrant of the brain, but as a social
construct. If responsibility is a social construct that exists under the rules of
society, and not in a lobe of the brain, a court cannot use neuroimaging to
evaluate whether a person is more or less responsible in a constructed social
system.4 0 Additionally, scholars have argued that the purpose of the law
reaches outside the scope of fact finding, but is also intended to set societal

34. Jones & Shen, supra note 6 (citing People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2004) rev'd,
843 N.E.2d 727 (2005)).
35. People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2004) rev'd, 843 N.E.2d 727 (2005).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Annas, supra note 5.
40. Vincent, supra note 12.
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norms, and neuroscience has no role in norm setting.4 1 Furthermore, the law
has already created avenues that excuse defendants of culpability when their
ability to choose responsible behavior is impaired, i.e. the insanity
defense.42 But the looming question for the criminal justice system concerns
the applicability of neuroimaging studies in determining criminal
responsibility.43
D. Criminal Culpability

To prove culpability prosecution must generally prove a defendant has
committed an offense knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence.44
This element establishes the mens rea, i.e., the mental state of the defendant
while committing the crime. Namely the court needs to determine whether
the defendant meets the element of intent present in a crime. The topic areas
below elucidate the ability of current neuroscience to prove and disprove
criminal intent factors.
1. DeterminingDeception

One criminal responsibility factor neuroscience aims to solve is lie
detection. Neuroscientists hope to detect when a defendant is lying using
brain imaging to create a map of brain patterns that correspond to deceptive
behavior. Although some companies have begun to make a profit by
claiming they have mastered this ability, the general neurological
community remains skeptical.45 The Guilt Knowledge Test was a study
conducted by the University of Pennsylvania to map deception in the brain
using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to monitor "regional blood
flow." 4 6 The study claimed to have perceived a difference in blood

oxygenation levels when a participant was truthful or deceptive.4 7 Each of
the 18 participants was asked a series of questions for which they had to
answer yes or no.48 The participants were all given a set of cards, each card
signaled whether the participant should lie or be truthful.49 Some of the

41.
Vincent, supra note 12 (citing STEPHEN MORSE, NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES
IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY, MORAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NEW

NEUROSCIENCE 33 (Judy Illes ed. 2006)).
42. Paul S. Appelbaum, Behavioral Genetics And The Punishment Of Crime, 56 L.
PSYCHOL. 25 (2005).
43. Id.
44. Model Penal Code § 2.02 (1962).
45. No LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/ (last visited May 24, 2015).
46. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An EventRelatedFunctionalMagneticResonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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answers would be false and the questioner had no knowledge of the
accuracy of the answers."o The study noted a contrast in the Functional
Magnetic Brain Imaging when a participant was lying or telling the truth."
The study concluded there is a "neurophysiological difference" between
lying and truth telling. 52
2. Impairment Through Malformation

Another criminal culpability factor neuroscience has pioneered is the
influence of brain abnormalities over behavior. "[D]amage to certain sectors
of prefrontal cortex produces a severe impairment of decision-making and
disrupts social behavior."53 A study conducted in the Department of
Neurology, Division of Behavioral Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience
from the University of Iowa College of Medicine determined that early
damage to the prefrontal cortex of the human brain could impair
development. The study showed an ability to demonstrate a lack of social
responsibility through neuropsychological evidence, observation of
subjects, and brain imaging. The study was uniquely telling because the
hypothesis and conclusions aligned by determining that adults who have
suffered lesions in the brain during adulthood have had decades of
established social development that can balance prefrontal brain damage,
but alternatively, subjects who suffered prefrontal damage early in their
lives were not able to develop advanced behavioral understanding or
appropriate application.5 4 Research has shown damage to the brain causes
"abnormal development of social and moral behavior," and this
development appears to be "independent" of the subject's influencing social
factors, which did not seem to have authority over the affected subjects."
3. The Adolescent Mind

Lastly, and a subject area covered recently, includes the culpability of
an adolescent criminal. The National Juvenile Justice Network has
conducted a number of research studies verifying the inability of
adolescents to fully comprehend and establish intent as an adult. The
studies contend the adolescent brain undergoes an extensive development
prior to adulthood including a "pruning" process in which the brain's "gray

50. Id.
51. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An EventRelatedFunctionalMagneticResonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002).
52. Id. at 731.
53. Steven W. Anderson, Impairment Of Social And Moral Behavior Related To Early
Damage In Human PrefrontalCortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032 (1999).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1036.
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matter" depletes and the body eliminates idle neural synapses and
strengthens those used more frequently, enhancing an adolescent's ability to
engage in "higher-thinking." 56 Most persuasive is the idea that juveniles
exhibit altered behavior in moments of "hot or cold cognition." 57 The study
showed, as adolescent brains are undergoing development their behavior is
influenced by their emotions, and their emotions are highly influenced by
their immediate environment." Although evidence collected by the
National Juvenile Justice Network, and similar organizations, is not
determinative, it is compelling, and has influenced decisions such as
removing juveniles from the criminal punishment of death row. These
monumental neuroscientific breakthroughs are the result of analysis and
interpretation of neuroimages. These images are the key component in the
presentation of neurological evidence.
D. Method ofImage Creation

Neurologists implement a variety of imaging studies in order to make
their diagnosis. The imaging information collected is juxtaposed with a
physical assessment of the patient. These two methods of data collection
allow the physician to assess their patients and make a diagnosis. There is a
vast degree of subjectivity involved in data collection from technique of
collection to data interpretation. There are four methods of neuroimaging
generally used, including Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Computerized
Tomography, Positive Emission Topography and Single Photon Emission
Computerized Tomography scans. Each has strengths and weaknesses in
identifying brain abnormalities.
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, commonly known as MRI, uses a
"powerful magnet" to acquire structural images of the brain.59 The high
spatial resolution of MRI has proven useful in discovering a variety of
"physiological" brain abnormalities such as brain hemorrhages.60
Computerized Tomography (CT) can also be used for collecting structural
imaging.6 1 CTs are recognized for their "high spatial and temporal
resolution."6 2 This means that the scan is capable of obtaining clear
resolution through a greater number of pixels, in addition to rapid photon
transmission. Jane Moriarty states, CT and MRI scans are typically
presented in U.S courts as evidence of brain trauma or neurological disease;

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

National Juvenile Justice Network, supra note 28, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Shafi, supra note 9, at 31.
Id.
Shafi, supra note 9.
Id. (citing Shelia Rankin, CT andMI, 23 SURGERY 239 (2008)).
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she argues that there " 'is general agreement and substantial proof of
reliability that CT scans and MRI technology can detect brain injury,
damage or atrophy.' "63 The Louisiana court of appeals accepted CT and
MRI images of a plaintiffs brain in McMahon v. Regional Transit
Authority to prove major contusions of the plaintiffs brain after being hit
by a city bus.6 4 The CT and MRI scans were approved and accompanied by
expert testimony explaining how the scans revealed significant bleeding in
the brain after the accident.
A SPECT scan or Single Photon Emission Computerized Tomography
serves a unique imaging purpose. Unlike an MRI or CT, a SPECT scan will
create a neuro-profile by observing blood flow throughout the brain.6 5 An
increase or decrease in blood flow could signify an abnormality. SPECT
scans are generally used to diagnose "neurological disorders" such as
dementia.6 6 The Michigan court of appeals allowed the use of a SPECT
scan in Fini v. General Motors Corp., concluding the scans were relevant
and reliable in demonstrating evidence of the plaintiffs brain function
idiosyncrasies after the defendant's car collided with the plaintiffs
vehicle.67
Positive Emission Topography scans (PET) are an invasive imaging
method which collects information regarding "blood flow, blood volume
and metabolism" after injecting the patient with a radioactive element that
presents itself in the image.6 8 The element is used as a trail of breadcrumbs
to "map" the activity in the brain.6 9 The purpose of a PET scan is to " 'show
cerebral dysfunction' " that cannot be adequately portrayed by structural
imaging such as a CT scan.7 0 The Supreme Court of Florida determined that
a trial judge abused his discretion in a burglary and murder case by refusing
to admit PET scan imaging to allow a neuropsychologist to further evaluate
the defendant's neurological damage.7 1
Lastly, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, also known as fMRI,
is the grander successor of PET and SPECT scans.7 2 The purpose of the

63.
Shafi, supra note 9 (quoting Jane Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging
Evidence In The U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. SC. & L. 29, 40-1 (2008)).
64. McMahon v. Reg'l TransitAuth., 717 So. 2d 1129 (1998).
65.
Shafi, supra note 9.
66.
Shafi, supra note 9, at 33.
67. Fini v. Gen. Motors Corp., 227592, 2003 WL 1861025 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003).
68.
Shafi, supra note 9, at 34.
69.
Shafi, supra note 9 (citing Mark Pettit Jr., FMRIAnd BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging And
The FederalRules OfEvidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 320 (2007)).
70.
Shafi, supra note 9 (quoting Zwany Metting et al., Structural And Functional
NeuroimagingIn Mild-To-Moderate Head Injury, 6 LANCET NEUROLOGY 699, 703 (2007)).
71. Hoskins v. State, 702 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1997).
72.
Shafi, supra note 9.
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fMRI is to study neurochemistry by measuring " 'localized brain activity by
determining blood flow and oxygen utilization in portions of the brain.' "7
A district court in North Dakota used fMRI images to monitor adolescents
as they watched simulated video games to measure violence. 4 The court
ultimately ruled the information was inconclusive, but the images were
allowed in the courtroom as evidence. 5
Legal professionals and neurologists are attempting to use each of these
methods to provide a link between brain activity and neural patterns, but no
evidence exists linking specific brain patterns to specific behavior. 6 Current
correlations are based on theory, but theory in conjunction with physical
examination and expert testimony may be enough to pass the admissibility
threshold. But the acceptance of neuroevidence implicates other concerns
beyond admissibility, including the ethics of practice.
E. Neuroethics
Neurolaw has ethical implications, such as invading a person's most
private and personal space, their mind; or procedural legal consequences,
such as depriving a defendant of their Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent, by taking the liberty of entering the defendant's mind.7 7 "Recently
scholars of neurolaw have considered how functional neuroimaging affects
the First Amendment right to privacy, the Fourth Amendment right against
(mental) search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, the possibility of introducing neuroimaging results as legal
evidence, and the degree to which the legal system should adopt a more
rehabilitative and less punitive approach to offenders."7 8 The last and most
riveting challenge is analyzing neuroimaging to determine which
defendants have diminished capacity, and which defendants have a lack of
virtue, and ". . . until we find a satisfactory way to demarcate the bad from
the mad, this conceptual difficulty will pose a significant stumbling
block."79

73.
Shafi, supra note 9 (quoting Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience,
Deception, And The Courts, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 460, 461 (2007)).
74. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005) aff'd, 469
F.3d 641(7th Cir. 2006).
75. Id.
76.
Shafi, supra note 9 (citing Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is A Picture Worth A Thousand
Words? Neuroimaging In The Courtroom, 33 A. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007)).
77. Vincent, supra note 12.
78. Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging Culture And Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 239, 240 (2009).
79. Vincent, supra note 12, at 18.
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F. The Future of Neurolaw
On its current trajectory neuroscience will be the catalyst behind
behavioral statutes.so These statutes would aim to encompass the guidelines
necessary to penalize human behavior based in part on brain imaging.
Currently litigants use neuroimaging in civil litigation and criminal trials to
affirm brain or spinal injuries, but researchers claim that neuroimaging can
be used as a mechanism to "demonstrate the propensity for violence, the
capacity to stand trial, as evidence of malingering, or to help establish or
diminish the criminal responsibility of a defendant."" Regardless of its
intended use neuroimaging can likely be intimidating and confusing to a
jury, and an expert witness would be necessary to alleviate the stress of
interpretation. Brain imaging can be highly relevant and probative
depending on the type of case, and it is physicians and lawyers who have
the ability to develop a new field of medicolegal research, which can help
each profession advance public policy.8 2
G. CorrelationBetween DNA and NeurologicalEvidence
Public policy and law have already demonstrated a willingness to
accept novel science. The willingness to admit scientific breakthroughs is
displayed by the acceptance of DNA evidence. As alluded to earlier, the
Federal Rules of Evidence have bestowed immense power on the word
"admissible." Admissibility is the crux to presenting a strong legal
argument in trial. Every piece of evidence presented during trial must meet
the admissibility standard set by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Public
policy has played a role in what is deemed acceptable in the courtroom. In
1980 states began enacting laws that made the collection and presentation
of DNA admissible evidence. The inauguration of DNA evidence was only
the beginning of contested admissibility standards. Current DNA statutes
focus on collection, method of gathering data, and qualifying admissibility.
The following discussion aims to draw a corollary between DNA
admissibility and the admissibility of neuroimaging evidence in the
courtroom, with a special focus on Minnesota law. The following will
outline: (a) what is required for neuroevidence to be deemed admissible by
comparing DNA admissibility, and (b) how public policy should be
fashioned to support its adoption.
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) acts as the framework for the human

80. Arnaudo, supra note 2.
81.
Shafi, supra note 9 (citing Eyal Aharoni et al., Can NeurologicalEvidence Help Courts
Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons From Law And Neuroscience, 1124 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 145 (2008)).
82. Annas, supra note 5.
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genome.83 DNA strands can be collected from human sources such as
blood, teeth, and saliva.8 4 "Awareness" of the power of DNA to solve
crimes has increased since the 1980s." In 1994 federal law authorized the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to create and manage a national DNA
database.8 6 The database would be a central information repository where
"DNA profiles generated from samples collected from people under
applicable legal authority and samples collected at crime scenes can be
compared to generate leads in criminal investigations."8 7
"DNA sequences" from crime scenes are analyzed and compared to
those in databases to help identify suspects." "State and federal DNA
databases have proved instrumental in solving crimes, reducing the risk of
convicting the wrong person, and establishing the innocence of those
wrongly convicted."8 9 Federal statutes give authority to collect DNA
samples from federal offenders. 90 The organization and collection of the
DNA database is coordinated by state and federal jurisdiction. State law
determines offender profiles susceptible to the state DNA database, while
federal law determines which State profiles are transferred to the national
DNA database. 91

"Minnesota law requires those convicted of a felony, those released
from prison after serving a felony sentence, those felons whom the state
accepts through an interstate compact, and those charged with certain
predatory felonies to submit a DNA sample." 92 Juvenile and adult offenders
charged with committing or attempting to commit a felony must submit to
DNA collection upon sentencing. 93 The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
collects and maintains DNA samples to create into profiles. 94 A suspect's
DNA sample will be destroyed if the suspect is found innocent. 95
Federal and State law statutes iterate the lawful procurement of felony

83. NATHAN JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAWS, GRANTS, AND ISSUES (2012).
84.
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85.

Id. at 2.

86.

NATHAN JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAWS, GRANTS, AND ISSUES (2012).
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Id. at 1.

89.
90.

Id.

91.
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Id.

93.
94.

Minn. Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1), (2) (1989).
Minn. Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1989).

NATHAN JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL
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JEFFREY DIEBEL, HOUSE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, MINNESOTA'S CRIMINAL DNA
COLLECTION AND PRESERVATION LAWS 1 (2006).

95. JEFFREY DIEBEL, HOUSE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, MINNESOTA'S CRIMINAL DNA
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DNA sampling. The purpose of DNA collection is to create a databank
large enough to convict reoffending criminals. This purpose was facilitated
by the role DNA evidence played in criminal prosecution.
H. DNA Admissibility
The advantage of DNA evidence is that it can determine with "virtual
certainty" the presence of a criminal at the crime scene.9 6 Forensic scientists
use statistical analysis to determine the source of a DNA sample and match
it to a DNA profile; thus, a determination is made by interpreting the
quantitative information produced by the DNA test.9 7 The statistical
significance of a match is calculated by implementing a two-step process:
(a) a determination as to the probability of the collected DNA being found
in a random sample population, and (b) a determination as to the probability
of having the same DNA structure in the collection and database.9 8 To be
admissible the information must be valid and reliable. To measure validity
and reliability the court analyzes the technique used to collect the data.9 9 "A
technique is valid if it produces accurate results [. . .] A technique is reliable
if it produces the same results time and again."100
The Frye court determined expert testimony to be admissible based on
scientific principles and procedures after they have "gained general
acceptance." 101 Application of the Frye verdict to the acceptability and
admissibility of DNA evidence supports two elements of DNA evidence:
(a) DNA evidence has the acceptance and backing of the scientific
community to produce reliable information, and (b) general acceptance of
certain scientific techniques that produce reliable results. 102 Thus, the goal
of neurological evidence is to establish general acceptance through: (a)
standardization of neurological evidence collection, to convict criminals,
and (b) general acceptance in the scientific community of collection
techniques.
1. NeurologicalAdmissibility.
The debate surrounding the merits of neuroimaging in the courtroom is
contentious. Proponents argue neuroimaging evidence may be more

96. George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission OfDNA Evidence In State And
FederalCourts, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2465 (1997).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2477.
101. Frye v. UnitedStates, supra note 17.
102.
Smith & Gordon, supra note 96.
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scientifically reliable than other forms of forensic evidence.103 Ultimately
two points befuddle scholars and postpone implementation in the
courtroom, uniformity in neuroimaging analysis and collection.
I. Future StandardizationofNeurolaw

Critics of neuroimaging evidence question the reliability of
neuroscience, and comment on weaknesses like the imperfect spatial
resolution provided by the images.104 "Critics argue courtroom use is
premature because the scans necessarily involve expert interpretations,
which depend heavily on the methods employed by the individual scientists
and researchers conducting the scans.""os Data is interpreted under the
implementation of varying choices and considerations. The lack of
standardization in data analysis causes great distress to the legal
community. The interconnected nature of the brain makes connecting brain
activity to behavior complex.106 Ultimately, legal scholars are concerned
neuroimaging provides little probative value for the jury, but instead
confuses and dazzles the jury with potentially prejudicial evidence.107
Ironically, a study conducted by the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
revealed DNA "mixture interpretation" to be subjective.10 s When 17 North
American DNA examiners were asked to submit their interpretation of an
identical DNA sample the results were inconsistent.109 Other studies have
evaluated the amount of subjectivity involved in interpreting DNA tests and
the amount of laboratory error present.110 Needless to say, interpretation
techniques and general acceptance of DNA evidence is questionable, and as
neurolaw emerges and continues to be rejected DNA scrutiny is amplified.
Proponents of neuroimaging claim that reluctance may stem from the
legal fields' commitment to supporting current paradigms. Even though
there is a certain amount of unpredictability in neuroimaging analysis,
analysis is defined by probability and inference interpretation; this is
standard scientific practice."' Thus, critics may not be resisting a new area

103. Adam Teitcher, Weaving FunctionalBrain Imaging Into The Tapestry Of Evidence: A
Case For Functional Neuroimaging In Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 355
(2011).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 386.
106. Teitcher, supranote 103.
107. Id.
108. Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity And Bias In Forensic DNA Mixture
Interpretation,51 SC. JUST. 204 (2011).
109. Id.
110. William C. Thompson, Subjective Interpretation, Laboratory ErrorAnd The Value Of
ForensicDNA Evidence: Three Case Studies, 96 GENETICA 153 (1995).
111. Teitcher, supranote 106.
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due to a lack of predictability, but because there is discomfort with
scientific practice. This inadvertently leads to a double standard, with
preference for DNA evidence, for example. If neuroscience will be used to
assess criminal responsibility it is imperative two mechanisms are
understood: (a) how experts will commonly analyze a neuroimage, and (b)
what criminal responsibility means in the context of image interpretation.
Additionally, legal guardians are potentially denying a defendant's rights to
effectively and truthfully present their cases, since defendants are more
likely to use neuroimaging evidence.112 Neuroimaging would "provide
litigants with the tools necessary to fully present and effectively argue their
case and would allow juries to evaluate and consider useful functional
neuroimaging evidence during the course of a trial."113 The debate amongst
scholars and legal guardians is rich regarding neuroscience in the
courtroom. Currently, there is no right or wrong answer, but the debates
follow themes; in particular, standardization and reliability. These concerns
raise the question, whether law can be crafted to accommodate
neuroscientific evidence the way it has DNA evidence?
1. Statute Construction.

State interpretation of the federal DNA directive is well constructed to
include when and how DNA evidence is admitted in criminal prosecution.
For instance Minnesota houses two guiding statutes in its "Evidence;
Witness" and "Criminal Code" chapters. Minnesota DNA statutes do not
require expert testimony to accompany DNA evidence because DNA
interpretation as a generally accepted scientific technique has already been
recognized. Minnesota Statute §634.25, Admissibility of Results of DNA
Analysis, states:
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis,
as defined in section 299C.155, are admissible in evidence without
antecedent expert testimony that DNA analysis provides a
trustworthy and reliable method of identifying characteristics in an
individual's genetic material upon a showing that the offered
testimony meets the standards for admissibility set forth in the
Rules of Evidence. 114
Additionally, Minnesota requires the DNA analysis of certain offenders
setting the stage for instances in which DNA interpretation is relevant and
mandatory, employing consistency in application. 15

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 358.
Minn. Stat. § 634.25 (1989).
Minn. Stat. § 609.117 (2010).
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Similarly, a statute outlining the admissibility of neuroimaging as trial

evidence should include references to the science's trustworthiness and
reliability. A neuroimaging statute will diverge from its DNA predecessor
by requiring expert testimony to be introduced at trial. Like DNA evidence
neuroimages can be complicated to interpret. But unlike DNA evidence, the
subjectivity associated with recognizing neuroimaging evidence is highly
publicized and a source of contention.
To eliminate the blind acceptance of neurodiagnosis the statute will
require expert testimony clearly delineating the physician's diagnostic map.
Of course this requirement will present some challenges, such as whether or
not the physician who ran the original test and concluded with the presented
diagnosis must be the one to testify, or would perhaps a neuropsychologist
be adequate replacement? A statute of the magnitude suggested would look
something like this: In a civil or criminal trial or hearing the power of the
court may admit neuroimaging or neurological evidence to support a claim
as long as the evidence meets the standard for admissibility set forth in the
Rules of Evidence, and the accompanying expert testimony assures the trier
of fact of the evidences' trustworthiness and reliability.
A statute addressing the needs of the legal community would place
validity in the analysis of neuroimages by radiologists and neurologists in
the courtroom, and allow the legal court system to do the rest, balance the
evidence. Statute implementation would better allow judges to facilitate
juror interpretation, by giving them the power to ask the appropriate
questions and insure presentation meets the Federal Rules of Evidence
standards. Science is ever expanding, as is the terrain of the law. A bridging
of Law and Science early in their communion would prevent back tracking.
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Evidence lend themselves not only to
steadfast rules, but also instructive commentary. If the legal field allows
neuroimaging to enter as trial evidence it should provide practitioners with
instructions on implementation. Articulation of neuroimaging in the
courtroom ought to be entered as a comment to "Testimony by Experts" in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 1 1 6 The comment should communicate
confidence in the methods used by physicians to analyze and assess
neuroimaging evidence, as well as a commitment to the authority of the
people to protect the rights of its citizenry through powers such as the jury
system.
CONCLUSION

A fair amount has been written about the admissibility of neuroimaging

116.
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evidence in the courtroom, but no known work has been presented
examining how neuroevidence and forensic individualization compare. 117
The goal of this paper was to research the current state of neuroimaging and
analysis as it relates to the law, as well as to explore a comparative study of
neuroevidence and DNA evidence. The neuroscience field has the tools
available to help determine a propensity for violence as well as diagnose
mental disclosure. Once standards have been set there is nothing limiting
the facilitative power of neuroimaging in the courtroom. Although the
acceptance of the field will create new problems, such as whether a mental
disease can eliminate criminal culpability, the promise of new puzzles
should not limit the potential power available. Research on the topic of
neurolaw is on the cusp of new policy and procedural law. Further
investigation and application will allow academics to develop more
definitive conclusions and make legal applicability a reality. This paper
aimed to illuminate an expansive issue, and analysis in this field of study is
only just beginning.
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